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The Philosophy of Intellect of
Robert Grosseteste
Robert Grosseteste first studied at the Cathedral School of Lincoln, serving
Bishop Hugh of Lincoln as clerk. In the 1190s Grosseteste was a clerk of the
Bishop at Hereford. The Cathedral School of Hereford was a center for Arabic learning in the late twelfth century. Grosseteste became familiar with Aristotle, Arabic scientific treatises, and the Neoplatonism filtered through
works such as the Theology of Aristotle, Fons Vitae or Liber de Causis. His
most important writings can be seen as a mixture of these three sources in
combination with Christian theology, in particular Augustine, Gregory, and
Boethius, as he owned copies of De Civitate Dei, Moralia in Job, and De
Consolatione Philosophiae. In his late career, Grosseteste translated the Celestial Hierarchy, Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Divine Names, and Mystical
Theology of Pseudo-Dionysius. In early treatises such as his Hexaemeron
and Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, written between 1228 and
1235, Grosseteste developed a philosophy of intellect, influenced by Greek
and Arabic commentaries on Aristotle’s De anima, which contain Neoplatonic influences. In the De anima of Aristotle, Book III, a productive intellect is distinguished from a potential intellect. In the De Anima of Alexander
of Aphrodisias, the productive intellect is the active intellect, or nous poietikos, and the potential intellect is the material intellect, or nous hylikos.
The material intellect is perfected as intellection as intellectus in habitu in
discursive reason or dianoia, which Grosseteste follows. The nous poietikos
is taken as a purely spiritual substance acting on human intellect, as in the
intelligentia of Grosseteste. The capacity for receiving the influence of the
nous poietikos is the material intellect, the nous hylikos, through which
knowledge is acquired.
Avicenna in the Liber Naturalis and Averroes in the Long Commentary
on the De anima, along with Alfarabi, in the Risala or De intellectu, influenced the thinking of Latin scholastics in the concept of the active intellect
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as the incorporeal agent leading the potential, material intellect to actuality, a
concept which can also be found in the De intellectu of Alexander of Aphrodisias, and the Fons Vitae of Avicebron. Avicebron described the active intellect as a transcendent and incorporeal, cosmic intellect, similar to the way
it was described in the Paraphrase of the De anima of Themistius, illuminating the anima rationalis, or rational soul. According to Roger Bacon, Adam
Marsh accepted the incorporeal active intellect as a divine intellect, as influenced by the Greek and Arabic commentators on Aristotle, as did Robert
Grosseteste, who distinguished a divine or cosmic intellect, intelligentia,
from an active intellect, virtus intellectiva, which actualizes a material intellect, virtus scitiva or virtus cogitativa.
This distinction can be found in the writings of Roger Bacon, Albertus
Magnus, and John Peckham. These three writers, along with Grosseteste,
Adam Marsh, and William of Auvergne, also see the divine intellect, the intelligentia, as illuminating the anima rationalis, in the irradiato spiritualis of
the lumen spiritualis, reflected spiritual light, in the synthesis of Aristotelian,
Neoplatonic, and Christian influences. In Grosseteste’s thought, the passive
intellect is defined as the virtus scitiva or virtus cogitativa, as a form of dianoia, the agent intellect is defined as the virtus intellectiva, and the Intelligence is defined as the intelligentia, as in the First Cause of the Liber de
Causis. As in the Liber de Causis, for Grosseteste the material intellect in the
lower part of the soul acts according to the impressions received of intelligibles from the intelligentia, as illuminated by the irradiato spiritualis, the inner light, and reflected as in a mirror.
In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Grosseteste, which contains his most extended commentary on Aristotle’s conception of intellect, as
light emanates from the sun, intelligibles are illuminated in the mind, or oculus interior. The intellectus in mind, virtus intellectiva or nous, abstracts universal ideas from the particulars of sense to form principles, but intelligentia
functions without a corporeal agent, and is assisted by Divine illumination.
The universal is the form or species, and is seen as a cause or principle of being. The universal exists in re in a particular thing, and causes the thing to be
what it is. The universal or species also exists post rem in intellectus, as an
abstraction from a particular thing, or intelligible. The principia essendi in
the thing become the principia conoscendi in the mind. In the Commentary
on the Physics of Grosseteste, written around 1230, the principia essendi of a
thing, its form or species, are the subject of human knowledge at three different levels. At the first level, it is the subject of ontology and natural philoso-
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phy. At the second level it is the subject of mathematics and geometry, as the
universal is abstracted from the particular in the principia conoscendi. At the
third level, it is the subject of metaphysics, as the principia conoscendi participate in the virtus intellectiva and Divine illumination.
The three levels of human knowledge of the principia essendi correspond
to the three levels of intellect outlined by Grosseteste in his sermon Ecclesia
Sancta Celebrat. Ratio, reason, is capable of grasping the objects of the natural sciences. The virtutes intellectiva et intellectualis are capable of apprehending the first principles of science and intelligibles. Intelligentia is the
participation of Divine illumination in intellect. In the Ecclesia Sancta, the
noblest capacity of human nature is the desire to know the lux spiritualis, the
spiritual light, in the intelligentia. In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Grosseteste, intelligentia is the supreme faculty of the soul. It is a
form of knowing which does not depend on sense perception or abstraction
in reason, or any material form, but rather on direct irradiation of the lux
spiritualis. In the Hexaemeron, intelligentia is described as a faculty of contemplation, with no connection to phantasia, imagination, or ratio. Following Augustine in De Trinitate, intelligentia is divided into memoria,
intelligentia, and amor, in the contemplation of the Trinity without material
phantasm, species sensibilis, or corporeal instruments, phantasia and ratio.
Ratio and imaginatio, and bodily operations themselves, operate in imitation
and the reflection of the similitudo of intelligentia.
In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, intelligentia is described
as the highest part of the anima rationalis, which is seen as separate from
corporeal motions and operations. In the treatise De statu causarum, the anima rationalis is described as an incorporeal intelligence mediating corporeal
virtus, the motion of which in the senses are the phantasmata, mnemic residues of sense impressions, of the imaginatio. The body is seen as an instrument in relation to anima rationalis, and only influences the soul indirectly.
In the treatise De intelligentis of Grosseteste, as the higher form of substance,
the incorporeal soul can be active in the body, but the body cannot be active
in the incorporeal substance. This is also expressed in the Hexaemeron and
the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics. The soul is seen as distinct from
the body. In the Hexaemeron the action of the body is compared to that of a
mirror that acts by means of reflections, created by the irradiatio spiritualis,
the illumination provided by the intelligentia of the higher soul, which is also
reflected in the virtus intellectiva and the virtus cogitativa, the lower levels
of the rational soul and the mechanisms of cognition in which the intelligen-
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tia participates.
In the Hexaemaron, sense perception is defined as the power of receiving
and grasping sensible likenesses without matter, that is, the senses receive
the species or eidos of the corporeal object and not the object itself. Sense
perception, as a lower part of the anima rationalis, is passive or potential in
relation to the ability of the anima rationalis to know or comprehend concepts, in the virtus cogitativa, or intelligibles, in the virtus intellectiva. The
anima rationalis is activated or becomes more attentive when the body is
acted upon, when the senses are stimulated. Sense perception itself is stimulated when the anima rationalis is able to free itself to some degree from the
corporality of the body which it inhabits, and to overcome its own passivity.
The anima rationalis, as the source of the movement of the body, pushes
against the passivity of the corporeal body. As it encounters more difficulties
in its task, it becomes more attentive. The anima rationalis is aware of the
difficulties caused by its pushing against the body’s passivity, and as a result
sense perception is painful or troublesome, and causes turbulence in the anima rationalis.
The passivity of the body is overcome when the passion of the body, the
amore or affectus mentis, caused by the multiple particulars of sense perception and the passivity of the body, fits with the working of the soul, when the
species of sense perception is corresponded to the intelligible, the species
sensibilis is corresponded to the species apprehensibilis, resulting from interior illumination, irradiato spiritualis, and the turbulence of the cooperation
between anima rationalis and body can be overcome, and the illumination of
the oculus mentis can function adequately so that the anima rationalis is at
peace in its activation in intellection. The anima rationalis is aware of the
peace that it can achieve in its overcoming of the passivity of the body, and
thus aspires to the higher forms of intellection, virtus intellectiva, which necessitates a freedom from corporeal desires in the higher parts of the anima
rationalis.
In the De motu supercaelestium of Grosseteste, the faculty of sense perception is controlled by the vis apprehensiva of the anima rationalis, and its
primary goal is only that of self-preservation. Sense perception is assisted by
sensus communis; imaginatio, the formation of the phantasmata in the oculus
mentis; and memoria; as such it allows knowledge to be possible, the scientia, knowledge gained by abstraction in reason, and the intellectus, the
knowledge of first principles or intelligibles; but sense perception is not the
cause of knowledge. Sense perception alone cannot apprehend universals,
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which are the materials of knowledge. In the Commentary on the Posterior
Analytics, sense perception alone can perceive things only in a particular signified place and time; it can only perceive a particular, without the context
given by intellectus and intelligentia. As space and time, intelligibles in the
virtus intellectiva, are the conditions of sense experience, sense experience
cannot be the cause of scientia, or virtus scitiva, or virtus intellectiva, although it acts as a mediator or instigator in the intellective process. It is up to
the intellectus to combine and differentiate the particular qualities of objects
as given by sense perception.
Because the species sensibilis, the form of the object, in sense perception
is connected to material objects, sense perception restricts the incorporeal
virtus of intellectus to a certain extent. In the Commentary on the Posterior
Analytics, the intelligentia, as the highest part of the anima rationalis, has
complete knowledge of both singulars and universals, because it is illuminated by a radiated light, the irradiato spiritualis, or lumen spiritualis, and it is
separated from the heavy, clouded body in sense perception, in the same way
that the anima rationalis is separated from the body. As such, intelligentia is
separated from the phantasmata of corporeal objects in the imaginatio, the
lower function of intellectus, and from the desire or amore created in the relation between the virtus intellectiva and the phantasmata, the affectus mentis, the desire created by the multiple and fragmented images of perception as
constructed in the virtus cogitativa or virtus scitiva. Sense perception supports the anima rationalis, but it is lower and separated from it, and is caused
by it rather than being the cause of it.
The body corrupts the purity of the eye of the soul, the oculus mentis,
making it cloudy and heavy. The virtus of the anima rationalis tends to be
focused on bodily and material things, on the body the motion of which it is
the source, and such a focus tends to lull the virtus of the higher intelligences, the virtus intellectiva, to sleep, restricting the incorporeal virtus, and restricting the ability of intellectus to engage the virtus intellectiva and aspire
to or be open to the intelligentia. The virtus scitiva and virtus cogitativa are
more weighed down by the corporeal species sensibilis in the phantasmata of
the imaginatio, and are limited in their abilities of intellection. Scientific,
discursive and dialectical reasoning are limited in their functioning, limited
in their capacity of apprehension, vis apprehensiva, and limited in their understanding of the functioning of intellect and knowledge in philosophical
terms. They are limited in their ability to grasp the creative and generative
functions of intellect.
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In Grosseteste’s Commentary on the Mystical Theology of PseudoDionysius, intelligentia functions independently of ratio, intellectus, and
phantasia, or imagination. Grosseteste compares intelligentia to the intellectus agens, agent intellect, and actio intellectus, active intellect, the intellects
which are differentiated from the passive, material intellect, discursive reason, in the De anima of Aristotle. In the Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, the origin of the principia essensi or universals is inaccessible to
cognition or knowledge, as they are the product of the intelligentia, so they
exist in an inchoate state as potentials, and are drawn out from potential to
action, in a possible or material state which is in the beginning passive and
not active. This reflects the structure of intellect as described by Aristotle, in
the relation between the potential, passive or material, agent and active intellects. The principia essendi are brought from potential to active in sense perception, which again is the foundation for knowledge, the knowledge of
universals, principia conoscendi, but not the cause. This is also described in
Grosseteste’s De Libero Arbitrio. As knowledge of the thing itself is impossible, scientific knowledge is based on the universals, the principia essendi
ante rem, which are elicited through sense perception, as illuminated by the
irradiato spiritualis in the oculus mentis. The principia essendi become the
material for scientific demonstration, as science cannot be based on the corruptible and variable knowledge of singulars and particulars given by sense
perception alone.
As human intellect does not have complete access to either the particulars
of the sense world or the principia essendi that correspond to those particulars in intellect, absolute knowledge and comprehension is impossible, mostly because of the corporeal instrument to which intellection is attached. The
anima rationalis does not have perfect vision in the oculus mentis of the
principia essendi which are illuminated by the irradiato spiritualis of intelligentia, as it is clouded by its connection to the body. The goal of intellection,
of intellectual activity, is to uncloud the lens of the oculus mentis as much as
possible, to purify the anima rationalis of its corporeal connections, and to
aspire to see the principia essendi as clearly as possible, though ultimately
completely clear vision is not possible. The goal of intellection is to uncloud
the lens of the oculus mentis in the anima rationalis so that it can receive as
much as possible the irradiato spiritualis which illuminates the intelligibles
and allows the mind to have clear understanding.

